Data Usage Control in the Future Internet Cloud by Michele Bezzi & Slim Trabelsi
Data Usage Control in the Future Internet Cloud
Michele Bezzi and Slim Trabelsi
SAP Labs,
06253, Mougins, France
Abstract. The increasing collection of private information from indi-
viduals is becoming a very sensitive issue for citizens, organizations, and
regulators. Laws and regulations are evolving and new ones are continu-
ously cropping up in order to try to control the terms of usage of these
collected data, but generally not providing a real eﬃcient solution. Tech-
nical solutions are missing to help and support the legislator, the data
owners and the data collectors to verify the compliance of the data usage
conditions with the regulations. Recent studies address these issues by
proposing a policy-based framework to express data handling conditions
and enforce the restrictions and obligations related to the data usage. In
this paper, we ﬁrst review recent research ﬁndings in this area, outlin-
ing the current challenges. In the second part of the paper, we propose
a new perspective on how the users can control and visualize the use
of their data stored in a remote server or in the cloud. We introduce a
trusted event handler and a trusted obligation engine, which monitors
and informs the user on the compliance with a previously agreed privacy
policy.
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1 Introduction
The vision of the Future Internet heralds a new environment where users, services
and devices transparently and seamlessly exchange and combine information,
giving rise to new capabilities. In order for it to materialize, this vision needs a
mix of adaptation of existing technologies and business models, such as ﬂexible
infrastructures and service compositions, distributed ownerships, and large-scale
collaborations. The cloud is one of the ﬁrst instantiations of these paradigms.
In the cloud users and businesses can buy computing resources (e.g., servers,
services, applications) provided by the cloud, that are rapidly provisioned with a
minimal management eﬀort and pay-per-use. In the cloud, data may ﬂow around
the world, ignoring borders, across multiple services, all in total transparency
for the user.
However, this ideal cloud world raises concerns about privacy for individu-
als, organizations, and society in general. In fact, when data cross borders, they
have to comply with privacy laws in every jurisdiction, and every jurisdiction has
its own data protection laws. In addition, the risk, for personal data to travel
across boundaries and business domains, is that the usage conditions agreed
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upon collection are lost, and, as a consequence, users cannot control their per-
sonal information any more, as well as, honest businesses may lose conﬁdence in
handling data, when usage conditions are uncertain.
To face these challenges, the concept of sticky policy has been introduced [5].
Personal information is associated with a machine-readable policy (sticky policy),
which stipulates the ways and means to treat that information (for example, ex-
pressing that the data should be used for speciﬁc purposes only, or the retention
period should not exceed 6 months, or the obligation to send a notiﬁcation to
the user when data are transfered to a third party). The sticky policy is prop-
agated with the information throughout its lifetime, and data processors along
the supply chain of the cloud have to handle the data in accordance with their
attached policies.
The concept of sticky privacy policy represents a powerful instrument to ad-
dress many privacy requirements. However, its application requires that several
problems be solved:
– Expressing privacy policy in a machine-readable language. Although various
policy languages have been introduced so far [7,1,2], there is no single lan-
guage able to completely address the most important privacy scenarios, such
as setting and comparing user preferences with server privacy policies, ex-
pressing conditions on complex secondary usage cases, specifying obligations
and integrating access control policies.
– Providing the data owner with a user-friendly way to express their prefer-
ences, as well as to verify the privacy policy the data are collected with.
– Develop mechanisms to enforce these sticky policies in ways that can be
veriﬁed and audited.
In this paper, we present recent results obtained by the European ICT project
PrimeLife which (partly) addresses these problems, introducing a novel policy
language to express complex privacy conditions, and the corresponding policy
engine able to process these policies. In particular, in Sect. 2 we introduce the
PrimeLife Policy Language (PPL), which combines access and data handling
policies; we then describe the corresponding policy engine, enabling the deploy-
ment, interpretation and enforcement of PPL policies. Although the proposed
solution can address the main requirements to manage privacy policies in the
cloud, there are still important open problems to address (see Section 3). In
particular, the current framework lacks mechanisms to provide the data owner
with the guarantee that policy and obligations are actually enforced. In Sect. 4,
we present our initial thoughts on how to implement a trusted system for policy
enforcement. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
2 Primelife Privacy Framework
In many web applications, users are asked to provide various kinds of personal in-
formation, starting from basic contact information (addresses, telephone, email)
to more complex data such as preferences, friends’ list, photos. Service providers
Data Usage Control in the Future Internet Cloud 225
Fig. 1. PPL high level architecture.
describe how the users’ data are handled using privacy policy, which is, more
or less explicitly, presented to users during the data collection phase. Privacy
policies are typically composed of a long text written in legal terms that are
rarely fully understood, or even read, by the users. As a result, most of the users
creating accounts on web 2.0 applications are not aware of the conditions under
which their data are handled.
Therefore, there is need to support the user in this process, providing an
as-automatic-as-possible means to handle privacy policies. In this context, the
European FP7 project PrimeLife1 developed a novel privacy policy framework
able to express and automatically process privacy policies in web interactions.
This approach enables applications, like web browsers, to automate the inter-
pretation of the content of a privacy policy and to compare the service privacy
policy with user privacy preferences.
The Primelife project introduced the PrimeLife Policy Language (PPL, herein)
[10,4], which allows to describe in an XML machine-readable format the condi-
tions of access and usage of the data. A PPL policy can be used by a service
provider to describe his privacy policies (how the data collected will be treated
and with whom they will be shared), or by a user to specify his preferences about
the use of his data (who can use it and how it should be treated). Before disclos-
ing his personal information, the user can automatically match his preferences
with the privacy policy of the website and the result of the matching generates
an agreed policy, which is bound to the data (sticky policy) and travels with
them. In fact, this sticky policy will be sent to the server and follow the data in
all their lifecycle to specify the usage conditions.
The PPL sticky policy deﬁnes the following conditions:
1 www.primelife.eu
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– Access control: PPL inherits from the XACML [8] language the access control
capabilities that express how access to which resource under which condition
can be achieved.
– Data Handling: the data handling part of the language deﬁnes two condi-
tions:
• Purpose: expressing the purpose of usage of the data. Purpose can be
for example marketing, research, payment, delivery, etc.
• Downstream usage: supporting a multi-level nested policy describing the
data handling conditions that are applicable for any third party collect-
ing the data from the server. This nested policy is applicable when a
server storing personal data decides to share the data with a third party
– Obligations: Obligations in sticky policies specify the actions that should be
carried out after collecting or storing a data. For example, notiﬁcation to the
user whenever his data are shared with a third party, or deleting the credit
card number after the payment transaction is ﬁnished, etc..
Introducing PPL policies requires the design of a new framework for the process-
ing of such privacy rules. In particular, it is important to stress that during the
lifecyle of personal data, the same actor may play the role of both data collector
and data provider. For this reason, PrimeLife proposed the PPL engine based on
a symmetric architecture, where any data collector can become a data provider
if a third party requests some data (see Figure 1). According to the role played
by an entity (data provider or data collector) the engine behaves diﬀerently by
invoking the appropriate modules.
In more detail, on the data provider side (user) the modules invoked are:
– The access control engine: it checks if there is any access restriction for the
data before sending it to any server. For example, we can deﬁne black or
white lists for websites with whom we do not want to exchange our personal
information.
– Policy matching engine: after verifying that a data collector is in the white
list, a data provider recovers the server’s privacy policy in order to compare
it to its preferences and verify whether they are compatible in terms of
data handling and obligation conditions. The result of this matching may be
displayed through a graphical interface, where a user can clearly understand
how the information is handled if he accepts to continue the transaction with
the data collector. The result of the matching conditions, as agreed by the
user, is transformed into a sticky policy.
On the data collector side, after recovering the personal information with its
sticky policy the invoked modules are:
– Event handler: it monitors all the events related to the usage of the collected
data. These event notiﬁcations are handled by the obligation engine in order
to check if there is any trigger that is related to an event. For example, if a
sticky policy provides for the logging of any information related to the usage
of a data, the event handler will notify the obligation engine whenever an
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access (read, write, modiﬁcation, deletion etc.) to data is detected in order
to keep track of this access.
– Obligation engine: it triggers all the obligations required by the sticky policy.
If a third party requests some data from the server, the latter becomes a data
provider and acts as a user-side engine invoking access control and matching
modules, and the third party plays the role of data collector invoking the obli-
gation engine and the event handler
3 Open Challenges
Although the PPL framework represents an important advancement in fulﬁlling
many privacy requirements of the cloud scenario, there are still some issues,
which are not addressed by the PPL framework.
Firstly, in the current PPL framework, the data owner has no guarantee of
actual enforcement of the data handling policies and obligations. Indeed, the
data collector may implement the PPL framework, thus having the technical
capacity of processing the data according to the attached policies, but it could
always tamper with this system, which controls, or simply access directly the
data without using the PPL engine. In practice, the data owner should trust the
data collector to behave honestly.
A second problem relates to the scalability of the sticky policy approach.
Clearly, the policy processing adds a relevant computational overhead. Its appli-
cability to realistic scenarios, where large amounts of data have to be transmitted
and processed, has to be investigated.
A last issue relates to the privacy business model. The main question is: What
should motivate the data collectors/processors to implement such technology?
Actually, in many cases, their business model relies on the as-less-restricted-as-
possible use of private data. On the user side, a related question is, are the data
owners ready to pay for privacy [9]? Both questions are diﬃcult to address, es-
pecially when dealing with such a loosely deﬁned concept as privacy. Although
studies exist (see [11,3], and references therein), mainly in the context of the web
2.0, we should notice that the advent of cloud changes the business relevance of
privacy. In fact, in a typical web 2.0 application the user is disclosing his own
data, balancing the value of his personal data with the services obtained. As
a matter of fact, users have diﬃculties to monetize the value of their personal
information, and they tend to disclose their data quite easily. In the cloud world,
organizations store the data they have collected (under speciﬁc restrictions) with
the cloud provider. These data have a clear business value, and typically com-
panies can evaluate the amount of money they are risking if such data are lost
or made public. For these reasons, it is likely that they are ready to pay for a
stronger privacy protection.
All these issues need further research work to be addressed. In the next
section, we present our initial thoughts on how we may extend the Primelife
framework to address the ﬁrst problem we mentioned above, i.e., how to provide
a secure enforcement for privacy policy.
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Fig. 2. The key elements of the extension of the PPL framework to guarantee the
enforcement of privacy policy.
4 Towards Privacy Policy Enforcement in the Cloud
In the current PPL framework, there is no guarantee of enforcement of the data
handling policies and obligations. In other words, we suppose that the server
enforces correctly the sticky policies, but, actually, nothing prevents him from
creating a back door in his database in order to get unauthorized access to the
collected information.
For this reason, we propose in the rest of the paper a secure architecture
for the enforcement of the sticky policies and facilitating the task of external
auditors to verify the compliance with the privacy requirements, as well as giving
the user control on the released data. The main idea is to introduce tamper-
proof [6] obligation engine and event handler, certiﬁed by a trusted third party,
which mediate the communication and the handling of private data in the cloud
platform. The schedule of the events, as well as the logs of these components can
also be (partly) accessed by the users to monitor the handling of their personal
information. Lastly, the trusted-third party can ensure the auditing of the whole
system.
Let us sketch how our proposal can work in a simple cloud scenario. Let us
consider a cloud platform provider, which hosts one or more services/applications
provided by external parties that deal with personal data (e.g., a human resource
management application, a remote storage service). Say, these services handle
personal data using a PPL framework (as described in Sect. 2). In order to
guarantee enforcement of the privacy policies and corresponding obligations by
the service, we replace the service provider obligation engine and event handler
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with a tamper-proof event handler and a tamper-proof obligation engine certiﬁed
by a trusted third party (e.g., governmental oﬃce), see Fig. 2. For instance, the
cloud provider may provide these certiﬁed components as premium service.
In fact, trust is an essential part of the cloud paradigm. If the data owner has
the guarantee from a trusted authority (governmental oﬃce, EU commission,
etc.) that the application hosted in the cloud is compliant with his privacy
requirements, he will tend to transfer his data to the certiﬁed host. In order
to certify the compliance of an application, the trusted authority has, ﬁrst, to
certify the secure privacy components in charge of enforcing sticky policies, then
to perform audits to check if the stored data are handled correctly.
The diﬃculty comes for the access to the database by the service provider.
One solution would be to use a speciﬁc tamper-proof database, but this can be
technically complex, and impact the business eﬃciency of the service provider.
A possible solution is to specify an API to access the database that is compatible
with the event handler. This API should be deﬁned as a standard interface to
communicate with the event handler and access to the database. The service has
to exclusively use an interface compatible with the standardized API, and this
should be subject to audit by an external trust authority (which could be the
same or not certifying the tamper proof components).
Fig. 3. A sketch of data track administration console
The particularity of this API is that all the methods to access the data can be
detected by the event handler. For example, if the service adds a new element
(data and sticky policy) this action should be detected, managed and logged
by the event handler. If there is any method (like table dump) to access the
database that cannot be recognized by the event handler, the service will not be
certiﬁed by the trusted authority.
Using a tamper proof event handler and obligation engine also gives the pos-
sibility of providing a monitoring console. The monitoring can be accessible by
any data owner, who, once authenticated, can list all the data (or set of data)
with their related events and pending or enforced obligations. The data owner
can at any time control how his data are handled, under which conditions the
information is accessed, and compare them with the corresponding stored sticky
policy. Fig. 3 shows a very simple example of how the remote administrative
console could be structured, this monitoring console could of course be more
complex. The remote monitoring console adds more transparency and more con-
trol to the data hosted within the cloud. It also allows the user to detect any
improper usage of his data, and, in this case, notify the host or the trusted
authority.
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The advantages of the proposed solution are twofold. First, from the data
owner perspective, there is a guarantee that actual enforcement has taken place,
and that he can monitor the status of his data and corresponding policies. Second,
from the auditors’ point of view, it limits the perimeter of their analysis, since the
conﬁdence zone provided by the tamper proof elements and the standardized API
facilitate the distinction between authorized and non authorized actions.
5 Conclusions
Cloud computing and the SOA paradigm are fundamental building blocks for the
Future Internet, enabling the seamless combination of services across platforms,
geographies, businesses and transparently from the user point of view. However,
these new capabilities may entail privacy risks. From the user perspective, the
risk is that of losing control of his personal information once they are released in
the cloud. In particular, when personal data are consumed by multiple services,
possibly owned by diﬀerent entities in diﬀerent locations, the conditions of the
data usage, agreed upon collection, may be lost in the lifecycle of the personal
data. From the data consumer point of view, businesses and organizations seek to
ensure compliance with the plethora of data protection regulations, and minimize
the risk of violating the agreed privacy policy.
The concept of sticky policy may be used to address some of the privacy
requirements of the cloud scenario. In this paper we reviewed the recently in-
troduced PPL framework, which provides a ﬂexible language to express privacy
policy as well as the necessary mechanisms to process and compare sticky poli-
cies. The current PPL framework presents some limitations; it notably requires
a high level of trust in the data collector/processor. We presented some initial
thoughts about how this problem can be mitigated through the usage of a tam-
per proof implementation of the architecture. This solution may increase the
trust on the cloud, but it still needs further studies to verify its applicability in
real life business scenarios.
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